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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Franco-German axis has been a transcendent force behind the European integration ever 
since the early years of the European Economic Community (EEC). Nevertheless, since the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the perception of a progressive distancing between 
France and Germany as far as the EU politics is concerned, has increased. The end of the Cold 
War supposed changes in the international order and at the national level (democratisation of 
the CEECs and the unification of Germany), thus, the Franco-German relationship and its role 
as the motor of the European Union (EU) changed as well.   
 
In this sense, the process of enlargement towards the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) has supposed a divergence of views between Germany and France. So, the Franco-
German axis has not defended this enlargement as a European policy. The non-joint position of 
the Franco-German couple on this issue has been consequence of their different perspectives. 
While Germany had national interests in the CEECs, the French national interests were towards 
the Mediterranean, and less towards the Eastern Europe. These different views caused the 
distancing between these two “big” countries, and maybe, the search by them of new allies in 
order to continue influencing in the EC/EU.     
 
 
The fifth enlargement includes the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)1 and the 
three Mediterranean ones (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey2). Nevertheless, owing to the weak 
influence of Cyprus and Malta on the Franco-German relationship, the Mediterranean 
candidates will not take into account in the present analysis. 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the fifth enlargement as one of the causes of the decline 
of the Franco-German axis as the motor of the process of European integration. However, 
before analysing the next enlargement, it would be necessary to have a look through the history 
of European Integration and concretely to the influence of the Franco-German relationship in 
the EC/EU. Regarding to the next enlargement towards the Central and Eastern European 
Countries, first, we will analyse the German interests, as well as the French interests, towards 
these countries. Furthermore, we will examine the Nice Intergovernmental Conference 
(December 2000) in order to verify if its almost failure was caused by the non Franco-German 
joint position. Finally, we will try to go further and hypothesise about new alliances with 
Germany so as to be more legitimate when playing the role of the leadership within the EU.    
 
 
I. THE FRANCO-GERMAN AXIS AS A REALITY  
 
 
European integration resulted from two World Wars, where France and Germany had been 
opposed. The Franco-German reconciliation within the European project was the only solution 
of four centuries of conflict in Central Europe.  
  
 
In this sense, Robert Schuman in his Declaration of 9th may 1950, planned by Jean Monnet, 
affirmed that “the coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-
old opposition of France and Germany3“. Thus, it was perceived that the only solution of the 
Franco-German opposition was through the European integration. It is important to keep in mind 
that the main reason for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and 
the European Economic Community (EEC) was the definitive end of the Franco-German 
tensions that had exploded into two World Wars. Hence, the Franco-German axis became one 
of the pillars of the European project, as well as its motor. However, in this first part of the 
history of European integration, France played a role of leadership. Until mid-sixties, we can 
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affirm that the Franco-German motor did not exist per se, it was France who assumed the 
leadership and Germany accepted the French proposals. Nevertheless, it is not possible to say 
that it was a unilateral leadership, however, France was the country who led the main progress 
of the European construction.      
.  
 
If during the fifties the Franco-German bilateral relationship had been developed in a multilateral 
framework, that is Europe and its integration, at the beginnings of the sixties, the leaders of 
France and Germany, Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer, felt that it was necessary a 
bilateral treaty of co-operation. In 22 January 1963, France and Germany signed the Treaty on 
Franco-German Co-operation, or better known as the Elysée Treaty. Although this treaty did not 
form part of the process of European integration, in some way it did influence and affect the rest 
of the membership of the European Communities. The regular meetings of two of the 
considered “big”4 countries and the co-ordination of their positions before the EC meetings, 
gave them a negotiating power and greater capacity of guiding the European project.   
   
However, after the signing of the Treaty but with the resignation of Adenauer, the close Franco-
German relationship did not go further, and thus, either the progress on the European 
integration. Between 1963 and 1974, the European project lived a period of stagnation 
exemplified in the crisis of the empty chair when de Gaulle abandoned the Council of Ministers 
from July 1965 to January 1966 or the two vetoes to the entry of the United Kingdom in 1963 
and 1967.  
 
“From 1974 onwards, the major advances made in the European project were again a result of 
proposals formulated jointly by France and Germany, and it was from then onwards that it 
became appropriate to refer to the ‘Franco-German engine’”5. In fact, clearly from 1974 to 1989, 
the Franco-German relationship developed in a long period of collaboration, not only in the 
bilateral framework but also within the EC shown in the creation of the European Council (based 
on a idea of Giscard d’Estaing) or the European Monetary System (EMS). Hence, during this 
period, France and Germany shared the leadership of the process European integration. 
 
 
Summing up the period between 1963 and 1989, we can affirm that France and Germany 
shared the leadership of the European Community. Both countries took profit from this dual 
leadership as well as the European integration continued its progress.   
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall, 9 November 1989, resulted to be a turning point in the European 
integration. The unification of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Democratic 
Republic of Germany (DRG) culminated in a new Germany that benefited from the progressive 
fall of its inferiority perception in the EC/EU. 
 
In Bocquet’s words:    
 
“Reunification has increased Germany’s international influence relative to that of 
France. This increase is not only a question of statistics (Germany’s population 
is 80 million, France’s 58 million; and Germany’s projected gross domestic 
product is significantly higher than that of the other major EU member states), 
but is also political and juridical: having recovered full national sovereignty, 
Germany is no longer handicapped by its former status as a divided country6”. 
 
Indeed, this change of perception was one of the causes of the change in the Franco-German 
shared leadership. As Bocquet has remarked the recuperation of the full national sovereignty in 
1990 signified also, the recuperation of the own discourse in European affairs. That is, Germany 
has not felt obliged to be the equal partner of France. Hence, the shared leadership lost its 
balance. In 1990, Germany started to have the strength to behave as a unilateral leader, even if 
it did not act in this way until mid-nineties. Nonetheless, it was not up to Nice Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) that Germany showed visibly its new role.  
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Another of the consequences of the fall of the Berlin Wall resulted to be the deepening in the 
political integration apart from the economic integration, already previewed before 1989. Only 
three months after the unification (3 November 1990), the Intergovernmental Conference on the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the European Political Union (EPU) took place as a 
demonstration that Germany would continue to bet for the European project as before. Despite 
the Franco-German joint letter presenting the common proposals before the Maastricht 
Conference, the divergence on other issues such as the conflict in Yugoslavia proved that the 
Franco-German axis had lost its balance. In the Amsterdam IGC in 1996, Germany and France 
presented again a joint position, this time on the enhanced co-operation. Despite this Franco-
German co-ordination, we can say, in Pedersen’s words, that “the post-Maastricht era also saw 
a change in the German leadership style within the EU, although to some extent this change 
reflected a change in the international and European agenda with the new issues of vital 
importance to Germany coming to the fore7”. This change in the German leadership style 
became more explicit in the Nice IGC, as we will see later.       
 
 
In this more than fifty years of European integration, there have been four previous 
enlargements8. The more members the EC/EU has, the less capacity of influence the Franco-
German axis can exercise. In the fifties and sixties, France and Germany played a significant 
role, above all France, due to that the main reason of the creation of the ECSC and the EEC 
was the Franco-German reconciliation. The first enlargement did not cause a substantial 
change in the Franco-German motor because the new member states were considered as 
“intergovernmentalists” and thus they were not possible allies. Even though the fact that the 
United Kingdom joined the EEC did not affect the Franco-German influence in a Europe of 9 
members, it did start to influence actively with the enlargement to twelve9. The enlargement 
towards the Mediterranean, that is Greece, Spain and Portugal, gave to France new allies to 
fight for similar interests. In an EC of twelve members, the considered Mediterranean ones had 
sufficient votes in the Council of Ministers to veto any decision. In 1995, when the EU grew until 
fifteen, the South lost this veto power and Germany started to look to the East and its new 
allies. The fifth enlargement differs substantially from the previous ones. The differences are as 
in the number of candidate members as in the economic conditions of these candidates. The 
Franco-German axis will not remain intact from this change of the European Union.  
 
  
II. GERMANY: THE EXPECTATION OF BEING THE CENTRE OF EUROPE 
 
 
The reunification of Germany supposed a big challenge in the daily politics of Germany before 
the European Union, but also before France, its traditional partner in the motor of European 
integration.  
 
 
The statement of “German led enlargement“10 is due to a multiple reasons. “Sources of German 
interest in the expansion of the Union are unique among EU member states deriving from 
location, traditional economic and political ties and history”11. Some of these reasons are:   
 
1.-The economic reasons are important at two levels. On the one hand, the state 
candidates represent an important export market because of the inclusion of such a 
vast area embracing 100 million consumers, and on the other hand, central Europe can 
become a profitable site for investment, with comparatively cheap and highly skilled 
labour12. In other words, “more than 1/3 of the economic gain that enlargement is 
expected to bring to the EU is expected to go to Germany13”. 
 
2.- The incorporation into the EU and the NATO of Germany’s state neighbours will also 
expand Germany’s own security belt. Besides, the possibility of the EU membership for 
the CEECs will guarantee lasting peace.   
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3.- The geopolitical aspect is often seen as the main reason for the German push 
towards the Eastern enlargement because it will make Germany the geographical 
centre of the EU. If during these 50 years of European integration, Germany was in the 
West periphery, with the fifth enlargement, it will become the centre of the EU. However, 
this aspect is related to the second one. Being the centre of the EU and having stability 
in its borders because the neighbour states are already in the EU are evidently 
interconnected.  
 
4.- There are psychological reasons, or in other words, there is a feeling of 
indebtedness to the eastern countries for drawing Germany to its unification in 1990. 
This gratitude extends, for example, to countries like Poland for its Solidarity movement 
since 1980 or Hungary that was instrumental in eliminating the Iron Curtain by opening 
its borders with Austria in 198914. 
 
 
The reunified Germany, with more than 80 million inhabitants, has the opportunity to become 
the leader of the EU without the support of France. The Franco-German axis has suffered from 
a distancing in the 90s. In fact, mainly, it has been Germany who perceived the new 
international order as an opportunity to consolidate its role of leadership in the EU in a unilateral 
way. The traditional role of shared leadership between France and Germany during the 
decades of the 70s and the 80s is not yet possible in the post-Cold War period. Despite the 
increase of economic problems such as unemployment and high inflation, the new Germany 
discovered a new role in the EU that it had been unthinkable before the reunification. Not only 
had Germany become an economic power, as explained before, but also the recovered full 
national sovereignty had made it a political power. “Although officials still referred to the 
centrality of the Franco-German axis within the EC and the importance of other large members 
such as Britain, they spoke of a new balance of power within the Community, with Germany 
placed on a more nearly equal footing”15. Hence, the balance of power would have definitively 
been broken and it favoured Germany.        
 
 
As far as the national interests16 are concerned, finally Germany is able to defend them without 
any fear of being accused of not being for the European interests, as it has already taken place 
since the 90s. The role played by Germany within the EU has been modified due to the 
reunification, and from the mid-nineties, but definitely as we will see later in the Nice IGC, this 
“big” member state adopts a position of pro-enlargement because of its economic and business 
interests in the Eastern Europe. 
 
 
The German government is more prepared to fight for its national interests within the EU, and 
less willing to sacrifice long-term reform goals for the sake of its relationship with France. Before 
the dilemma to take a similar position from France, and thus to take a reticent position to the 
enlargement, or to pledge its firm commitment to enlarge the EU towards the East, Germany 
took the second option, influenced by the benefits of this option because of its national interests. 
Indeed, “while the concrete analysis has identified a coherent and long-term German grand 
strategy relating to European integration, it has also highlighted the growing tension within 
Europe’s dual core caused first by German unification and subsequently by the ongoing process 
of geographical enlargement17”. So, the Franco-German axis, or the dual core in Pedersen’s 
words, suffered from the two processes caused by the end of the Cold War.   
 
At the end of the day, however, the German policy of fixing its priorities looking at the Eastern 
Europe is not new neither a consequence of the unification. As J.M. Beneyto described, in the 
90s, Germany substituted the “Ostpolitik”, developed in the seventies and eighties as a policy of 
opening towards the East, for the “Europapolitik”, an European strategy in which Germany 
would be the main driving force of the enlargement towards the Central and Eastern Europe18. 
So, as the national interests are a constant variable, or at least have a little evolution, of the 
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Foreign Policy of any state, the German national interests towards the Eastern Europe has 
remained important despite the reunification.   
 
Finally, the words of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, shows the 
German commitment to the Eastern enlargement. “Enlargement is a supreme national interest, 
especially for Germany. It will be possible to lastingly overcome the risks and temptations 
objectively inherent in Germany’s dimensions and central situation through the enlargement and 
simultaneous deepening of the EU. (...) Enlargement will bring tremendous benefits for German 
companies and for employment. (...)19”. 
 
 
III. FRANCE: A RETURN TO THE DOMESTIC POLITICS  
Nevertheless, not only has the increasing distancing between France and Germany been 
caused by the potential new role of the latter country, but also the different perceptions of 
France before the future enlargement towards the Central and Eastern Europe has intensified 
this effect.  
Although France, at first, opposed to the Eastern enlargement, it soon became conscious that 
the enlargement was unavoidable. It can be said that at the beginning of nineties, France took a 
position of ambiguity in its European policy towards the enlargement. To put it briefly, before the 
dilemma of enlarging or deepening, the French State fought for the deepening of the EU 
postponing the enlargement, while Germany was in favour of reconciling both processes. Apart 
from that, France supported one of the Eastern Candidates, Romania, with which it had 
longstanding cultural ties. Hence, it means that France had partial interest towards the 
enlargement. Despite the French support, this country and Bulgaria finally kept out the first 
wave of enlargement because of their delay in adapting their legislation into the acquis 
communautaire.  
 
In fact, Germany did not cause the progressive distancing between France and Germany 
unilaterally. France had seen its power been reduced by internal problems. On the one hand, 
the incapacity of France to exercise an international role as a big power, or in other words, a 
weak French Foreign Policy decreased its prestige as a European power. If France had headed 
the beginnings of the European project with, for instance, the proposals of Jean Monnet and 
Robert Schuman, after the end of the Cold War, it was not able to lead unilaterally getting 
similar results. On the other hand, a long period of cohabitation in domestic politics (more than 
five years with a Socialist Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, and a Gaullist President, Jacques 
Chirac, from 1997 to 2002) made it difficult to influence in the EU. In other words, “France is no 
longer truly Germany’s equal. The post-war duo no longer drives Europe. France will certainly 
not have the main say when the club has nearly doubled in size20”.  
 
 
Actually, the German push towards the Eastern Europe and the shift in the EU centre worried 
Paris at two levels. First, France was concerned about the continued influence of the Franco-
German axis on European events because this founder member state was aware of its 
unilateral incapacity to play the leadership. And second, France feared that the new balance of 
power in Europe could relegate it to the fringes of the European arena. In this sense, Jacques 
Chirac, proposed, in June 2000, “the celebration of a German-Franco Conference per year in 
order to light the future together21”. This proposal demonstrates, again, that France was aware 
of its necessity to remain with Germany in the European construction and the next enlargement.   
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However, on the contrary, France knew that “its interests in Eastern enlargement were linked to 
broader security and geopolitical issues which include NATO expansion and relations with 
Russia”22. This is  another of the reasons why France did not oppose firmly to the enlargement, 
although it would prefer to postpone until the deepening of the EU would be done.  
 
 
As we have exposed in the first part of the paper, Germany put its attention into the Eastern 
Europe, and thus into the enlargement. In order to counterweight the German leadership in the 
East, France turned into the Mediterranean, its traditional region of influence. In Scharping’s 
words, “The East is to Germany what the South is to France”23. So, “France has cleverly took 
advantage of the emergence of the Mediterranean discourse and the regional initiatives so as to 
revitalise and renew its Foreign Policy”24. Thus, although the weakness of the French leadership 
in the EU caused by the internal problems, France tried to have the leadership in at least the 
Mediterranean policy, however, it shared that leadership with Spain as we can notice in the 
Barcelona Process.    
 
 
The last results of Eurobarometer of spring 200225 showed that France and Germany have the 
worst results in supporting the enlargement, apart from the United Kingdom. France fears that 
the enlargement would reduce its benefits from the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) and 
Germany is worried about the economic costs of the enlargement.  
 
 
IV. THE DECLINE OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN AXIS IN THE NICE IGC? 
 
 The Treaty of Amsterdam26 had not solved the necessary institutional reform that the EU 
needed to be ready for a membership above 25. The EC institutions conceived for six members 
(the founders members were France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux) could not work in the 
same manner after the fifth enlargement. The proper reform of the institutions was a “leftover” 
that needed to be dealt before the enlargement towards the CEECs and the Mediterranean 
candidates. This meant that it was necessary a new Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to 
adapt the EU to the new situation. Thus, in the first semester of 1999, with Germany holding the 
EU Presidency, the 15 decided to convene an IGC for 2000 in order to solve the institutional 
issues left open in Amsterdam, issues that apparently required a settlement before the EU could 
be enlarged. In effect, the 15 convened that in any way, the deepening had to be done before 
the enlargement. Nevertheless, the contradiction of the national interests among the 15 resulted 
to be an obstacle in deepening and reforming the European institutions. Thus, finally, Nice has 
to be understood more as a postponing of the real institutional reforms  than an effect towards 
the deepening. 
Even though Pedersen had exposed that “by the late 1990s, the Franco-German axis was still 
functioning and there seemed as yet little prospect that it would change role from motor to 
detonator”27, in 2000, and more precisely in the Nice IGC, this axis was not yet possible. First of 
all, in Nice, there was not a Franco-German joint letter presenting their previous agreements28. 
Later, the national positions of France and Germany defended during the IGC were completely 
opposed.  
Indeed, Nice represents the first time that Germany showed the chips of its national interests. 
As Gerhard Schröder stated some days before the Conference, Germany would do an 
“unlighted defence of our own interests29”. Clearly, during the Nice negotiations, Germany 
fought for its national interests based in the assumption that nowadays it is the most populated 
state in the EU. Germany demanded more votes in the Council than France, that meant, a 
demand of breaking the traditional parity between these founders’ members. During the 
previous days of the IGC, the different opinions between French and German leaders on the 
possibility of breaking the Franco-German parity were headlines in the newspapers. While 
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Germany appealed to the difference in million population between France and Germany, the 
former searched its arguments in the history of the ECSC, when Konrad Adenauer promised to 
Jean Monnet that France and Germany would never break the principle of equality in all 
European institutions as a symbol of “definitive reconciliation”30.  
 
In the end, on the one hand, the Franco-German equality in votes in the Council of the EU was 
maintained, but on the other, Germany pressed for the triple majority: votes, member states and 
population. “For a decision to be adopted it must have the agreement of the majority of the total 
number of the Member States, between 71 and 74% of weighted votes, and if a Member State 
so requests, 62% of the total EU population31”. So, Germany with two other large countries 
(France, Great Britain or Italy) is the only possibility of vetoing a decision using the population 
majority. All the other options are possible with the population of four or more  member states. 
Furthermore, the Nice Treaty breaks the Franco-German parity in the European Parliament, as 
Germany will have the biggest representation with 99 seats. At the end of the Nice IGC, 
Gérhard Schröder affirmed: “We have succeed in doing what it was possible to do”32, as well as 
that conflict would have “shaken the Franco-German relationship in a way that we would not 
have wished33”. Therefore, finally, Germany preferred to maintain the close relationship or in 
other words, the formal dual leadership, rather than started a conflict with France.   
 
 
The lack of understanding between France and Germany in the Nice IGC was probably 
conditioned by other factors. For instance, the fact that France held the EU Presidency during 
the IGC, and thus the Nice summit as well, could become an inconvenience for the 
collaboration between France and Germany to present joint positions. As Kirchner points out 
the state that holds the presidency ”plays a crucial role in the agenda-setting if the various 
levels of Council and acts as a catalyst or consensus former in the EU decision-making.”34 
Hence, this state can not form coalitions in order to influence in the final agreements or to 
impose their national interests to the Union because it represents and defends the Community 
interests while it has the function of Presidency.  
Another possible condition for this misunderstanding is the fact that it did not exist chemistry 
between Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac. “The personal relationship between today’s 
political leaders is not what we witnessed in the Köhl and Mitterrand era”35.  
 
Anyway, although these two presented factors conditioned the Treaty of Nice, they did not 
determine it. As exposed before, the main reason for the incapacity of Nice of being a real 
deepening, and hence, preparing the EU institutions for the enlargement was the defence of the 
national interests by each member state, but above all by the “big” ones.  
 
By way of example of the German rapprochement towards the East is the Schröder’s visit to 
Warsaw. Just before the Nice Council, the Chancellor Schröder visited Poland as a symbol of 
the close relationship between both countries and as a demonstration of its support for the 
Polish membership. Not only does Germany believe in the advantages of the Polish-German 
axis, but also Poland believes that it will gain with the German leadership in the EU, as the 
Secretary of the Office of the Committee for European integration in Warsaw highlighted during 
the Schröder’s visit: “The confirmation of Germany’s political will to play a leading role and to set 
the pace for EU expansion bodes well for Poland”36. This might show how alternative coalitions 
seem to be possible for Germany in an enlarged Union.  
 
In conclusion, “the summit proceedings showed that the Franco-German ‘couple’ are 
increasingly living separately. Far from working as a team at Nice, the French and German 
leaders displayed personal animosity”37. Indeed, Nice did not supposed the definitive breaking 
of the Franco-German axis, but the clear evidence that the axis will work depending on the 
issues, and moreover,  other new alliances are possible in the EU after the enlargement.   
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V. A VIEW TO THE FUTURE: OTHER POTENTIAL CLOSER 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 Germany did not succeed in breaking the parity with France as far as the number of votes in 
the Council was concerned. However, the Nice IGC confirmed the German unilateral leadership 
in the EU, as well as, that the former close relationship between France and Germany had 
ended. The question now is if Germany will take the role of the unilateral leader or if it will prefer 
to search new allies in a new EU of 27.  Consequently, it is in this point that the enlargement 
towards the Central and Eastern European Countries has the main effect because it opens 
Germany to a wide range of possible alliances.  
First of all, the fact that the Franco-German axis did not exist in the Nice negotiations, does not 
mean that a Franco-German good relationship is not possible in the future. It is probable that 
the referred axis last as a way of influencing on concrete issues, but, in any case, it will not 
behave so intensely as before. Therefore, future punctual Franco-German agreements will not 
mean that the long-term Franco-German axis is still alive. On the other side, this paper will not 
focus on the possible alliances of France because although it is certain that there will exist, 
probably they will not have the same influence than the German ones.   
Secondly, as we have tried to show in this paper, the future entry of the CEECs in the EU will 
give fresh impetus to Germany because it means the possibility of new allies. At least for the 
moment, ten of the CEECs will get the membership in 2004 or 2005. In order to be more 
influential, the CEECs will search the German umbrella. Knowing the historic bonds of 
friendship and cultural ties between Germany and Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, 
but above all Poland, it is easy to understand that the strengthening of ties when its neighbours 
become EU members is possible, and even more, probable. Germany could prefer an strategic 
axis with these new members than the one it has, or better it had, with France, even if this is still 
early to prove. 
In addition, if this axis became a reality, the German centrality of Europe would be reinforced. 
But, apart from becoming the centre of Europe, the German language would increase its 
speakers. That is, the German language could substitute the French in its position as the 
second language in the EU, after the English that has become the first and the most used 
language in the European institutions.   
Poland is undoubtedly the Eastern state that will have a closer relationship with Germany. Apart 
from having historic and economic ties, the fact that Poland will be the only new member state 
with the status of “big” member (in the same conditions as Spain) seems to suggest a greater 
influence of a potential Polish-German axis.  
Nevertheless, we cannot forget the other big member states, and above all, the United 
Kingdom. Finally, this big country has learnt that its national foreign policy involves the 
European Foreign Policy. Although the transatlantic ties are still strong, and September 11th is 
a good demonstration of it, Europe, and above all the EU, plays an increasing role in the British 
Foreign Policy. If shortly after the Second World War, Winston Churchill observed that the 
British Foreign Policy laid in three interlocking circles: Europe, the Empire and the ‘special 
relationship’ across the Atlantic, in the 90s and less in the third millennium, these circles are not 
yet valid38. Europe has been imposed on the other circles, despite the fact that the transatlantic 
relationship still remains high ranked in the British Foreign Policy. However, what it is still 
uncertain is if Britain finally will opt to play a crucial role in the EU and if this role can be next to 
Germany. It seems that Great Britain is abandoning its intergovernmentalist approach whereas 
Germany is more pro-national interests, and thus, their approaches within the EU are getting 
closer. A recent proof of it is the letter of the Chancellor Schröder and the Prime Minister Blair to 
the President of the European Council about the Institutional Reform39 in February 2002. To 
sum up the potential British-German partnership as an “alliance of necessity” we take Grabbe 
and Münchau’s words:  
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“The opportunities for the UK and Germany to co-operate at European level are 
perhaps the best in decades. Germany is less preoccupied with the challenge of 
unification, and is in the process of ‘normalising’ its foreign policy and military 
roles. The UK is becoming a less reluctant player in European integration, and 
is even leading the EU defence”40        
 
In conclusion, Germany will play a different role in a EU with 27 o 28 member states. For the 
moment, the probable alliances within the EU are drawn. the future will tell us if they will 
become true or rather if the Franco-German motor will be substituted by other axis such as the 
Polish-German or the British-German ones. Nonetheless, these new alliances will not have the 
same depth than the Franco-German relationship had in a EC of 6 member states. The number 
of the membership is crucial to understand the way of influencing not only in the daily politics 
but also in long-term EU politics such as the Eastern enlargement. Thus, the future EU will 
probably not have any kind of permanent axis.     
   
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
   
The perspectives of Eastern enlargement, among other factors, influenced the progressive 
distancing between France and Germany during the nineties. Increasingly, the Franco-German 
axis lost its influence within the EU, and even the bilateral relationship lost the periodicity of its 
meetings and its joint policies. Nevertheless, this distancing was due to both countries. On the 
one hand, Germany started to give priority to its national interests, on the other, France resulted 
not to be the European power that it had been mainly in the fifties but also in the sixties, 
seventies or even in the eighties.     
 
The main objective of Nice IGC was to prepare the EU before the enlargement towards the 
CEECs and the Mediterranean candidates. The institutional reform proved that the member 
states were more worried for its short-term national interests rather that the enlargement as the 
European long-term interests did.   
In this sense, France and Germany played this role as well as they broke definitively the 
balance of power that resulted from the shared leadership of the EC/EU. “Dual hegemonies 
create special problems since there will normally be an imbalance of power between the two 
partners in the hegemonic core”41. Consequently, the Franco-German motor was not able to 
persist, and besides, the changing scenario of the nineties accelerated the split of the Franco-
German axis. That split was reaffirmed in the lack of agreement between these two big founder 
member states in the Nice IGC. 
 
The traditional balance between France and Germany has been eroded. Germany has 
consolidated its role of leadership in the EU, and above all towards the candidate countries. So, 
the increasing role of Germany was another of the conditions of the decline of the Franco-
German motor within the EU.  
 
The enlargement towards the Central and Eastern European Countries has modified the 
alliances within the EU. If in a EEC of 6 member states, the Franco-German axis was crucial for 
the daily European Politics, nowadays, with a Europe of 15, it is not yet possible the same 
influence of that axis, and it focuses on high politics as exemplified in the IGCs.  Then, with an 
EU of 27 or 28 member states, the influence of two of them is difficult and wide coalitions based 
in similar interests become more probable.  
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Finally, in 2001 and 2002, Germany has mortgaged the date of the entry of the candidates to 
the cut of CAP expenditure. Indeed, the biggest net payers to the EU budget, that is the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany, insist on cutting the CAP expenditures, and 
thus, fighting for a re-negotiation of the CAP and the Structural Founds before the EU 
enlargement. Perhaps, it seems that at the last moment, Germany does not favour the Eastern 
enlargement, but it is its defence of national interests that dominates the present scene. The 
short-term German interests determine, for the moment, the long-term European project: the 
Eastern enlargement.  But not only do these German interests determine the European ones, 
but they also conditions the long-term own interests based in the business and trade relations 
with the Central and Eastern European Countries. Nevertheless, sooner or later, the fifth 
enlargement will become a reality. 
 
 
Since the Nice IGC until the first semester of 2002, the Franco-German axis, motor or close 
relationship did not influence the European politics. Moreover, the different opinions in some of 
the more crucial aspects of the European integration such as the debate on the future of the 
EU, the enlargement or the reform of the CAP expenditure have increased the feeling that the 
“Franco-German does not exist any more. It is in crisis42” as affirmed a Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of one of the Member State of the European Union in Seville summit. However, the last 
Franco-German summit in Schwerin (East Germany) in 29 July 2002 demonstrated that both 
countries wish to relaunch the Franco-German close relationship in order to give the last boost 
to the Eastern enlargement.  As Jacques Chirac avowed, “the Franco-German motor is 
essential for the success of the EU, above all at the moments that important expiry dates are 
present: the reform of the institutions, the enlargement, the affirmation of the Europe’s place in 
the world.43” It seems that France and Germany want to sign a new Treaty of Elysée in the 
fortieth Anniversary of it in January 2003. However, the German elections, the lack of 
agreements in important aspects of the European politics and the different political situation of 
Germany in 1963 and 2002 may get dark these intentions.  
 
 
For the moment and to sum up, making a view to the future, we would suggest that Germany 
will not take a permanent partner in order to influence in the EU. Instead of that and depending 
on the issue, it will choose the most suitable “big” partner among France, Britain and Poland.   
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